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Abstract
An electronic survey was disseminated amongst infection control practitioners to investigate the variation in practices
toward vancomycin resistant enterococci. There were 235 analysable responses, mostly from doctors, in 48 countries.
The survey considered active surveillance, in-hospital precautions and tagging and untagging processes. There was a
great variation in responses between and within countries highlighting a gap in guidance for practitioners on which to
base institutional policy.
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Introduction
Vancomycin resistant Enterococcus (VRE) emerged inter-
nationally through the 1990’s. Prevalences today vary
widely, with between 0 and 45 % of E. faecium isolates
demonstrating glycopeptide resistance in European coun-
tries [1]. In the United States of America (US) 3 % of hos-
pital acquired infections were due to VRE [2]. The risk of
invasive disease in VRE colonized patients is 4 % but can
be upto 14 %, in immune suppressed patients, highlighting
the importance of infection control measures especially in
countries with a high prevalence [3, 4].
In the last 10 years, however, uncertainty has in-
creased regarding the infection control prioritisation of
this organism. Initially there were concerns over hori-
zontal gene transfer and the possible emergence of
Vancomycin Resistant S. aureus but this situation has
not been realized. The treatment paradigm for VRE
improved with the advent of linezolid and daptomycin
in 2000 and 2003.
Now, in the era of carbapenemase producers and poly-
mixin resistance, many question where as a priority VRE
control should sit. The optimal approach to screening,
isolation and surveillance is unclear, reflected by the
paucity of international guidelines for VRE screening
and infection control, with the most recent published in
the United Kingdom and by the US Centres for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) in 2006 [5, 6]. Inevitably,
individual institutions have had to develop their own
infection control approaches for VRE.
We sought to determine the approach to VRE control
in different centres internationally.
Methods
An electronic survey was created on survey monkey [7].
The survey was kept concise to facilitate contributions
and required just a few minutes. The full survey is
attached in the Additional file 1.
Recruitment of participants
The link was forwarded to members of the International
Society of Chemotherapy (ISC) infection control work-
group, the Infection Prevention Society (UK) and Oz
bug (Australian list server). Personal contacts of the
authors outside of these organisations were also invited
to participate, and all recipients were asked to further
refer the link to infection control practitioner colleagues
world-wide.
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Questions were multiple choice, most had a free text
option and none were compulsory (Fig. 1). Optional
demographic information included name, occupation,
email address, type and country of institution. Areas
assessed included VRE active surveillance, infection con-
trol precautions undertaken and labelling of patients.
These terms were not specifically defined. Responses
where the institution or country was not named were
eliminated. Where more than one response was received
from the same institution, the majority/most consistent
response was selected and responses were merged.
The initial analysis reviewed all institutional responses,
then a more focused analysis of countries with four or
more institutions represented was performed to assess
for international and intranational variation.
Results
Demographics
There was a total of 235 responses from 48 countries,
with 189 institutions represented (see Table 1 for the
full country list). Of the 234 who provided occupation
details, 161 (69 %) were doctors, 51 (22 %) nurses, and
22 (9 %) other including medical laboratory scientists,
pharmacists, infection control staff, clinical scientists
microbiologists and an epidemiologist.
Of the 234 respondents who provided information re-
garding their place of work, the majority were in acute
care, with 177 (76 %) from a tertiary referral centre, and
48 (20 %) from an acute care hospital. Only nine (4 %)
were from a non-acute health care facility or hospital.
Priority of VRE
VRE was given a high infection control priority with spe-
cific efforts in 95 (51 %) of the 187 institutions that
responded to the question. It was prioritized “similar to
other infection prevention efforts” by 51 (27 %), low pri-
ority 28 (15 %) and rarely considered in only 13 (7 %).
Screening
Of 187 institutional responses to screening, active sur-
veillance was practiced by 135 (72 %) with 18 (9 %) of
those stating it was universal, and the remaining tar-
geted. A minority, 39 (21 %) performed no surveillance
at all, and 13 (7 %) performed surveillance on stool cul-
tures sent for other reasons.
Of the 117 institutions that employ targeted screening,
42 (36 %) didn’t respond to the question regarding
which target group they select. 52 (44 %) screen those
that are at high risk for disease such as the immune sup-
pressed, and 23 (20 %) targeted patients at high risk for
a positive result such as previous antibiotic exposure or
Fig. 1 Non Demographic VRE Survey Questions (arrows show the follow on questions for respondents who selected the answer leading to the arrow)
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Australia (37) 3 (8) 3 (8) 31 (84) - 2 (6) 6 (18) 1 (3) 25 (73) 2 (6) 3 (9) 3 (9) 16 (45) 11 (31)
Canada (4) 3 (75) - 1 (25) - - - - 4 (100) - - 1 (25) 2 (50) 1 (25)
China (4) - 1 (25) 1 (25) 2 (50) 1 (25) - - 3 (75) - 1 (25) 2 (50) 1 (25) -
Denmark (8) 4 (57) 1 (14) 2 (28) - - 1 (14) 3 (43) 3 (43) - 2 (29) 3 (43) 1 (14) 1 (14)
Malaysia (6) 1 (17) 4 (66) - 1 (17) - 2 (33) - 4 (67) 2 (33) - 1 (17) - 3 (50)
Netherlands (5) 1 (20) 4 (80) - 1 (25) - - 4 (80) - - - 5 (100) -
New Zealand (7) - 1 (14) 5 (72) 1 (14) - 1 (17) 1 (17) 4 (66) - - - 2 (33) 4 (67)
Singapore (7) - - 7 (100) - - 2 (40) - 3 (60) - 1 (14) - 6 (86) -
Turkey (5) - - 5 (100) - - - - 5 (100) 1 (20) - - 2 (40) 2 (40)
UK (31) 5 (17) 10 (33) 12 (40) 3 (10) 4 (14) 4 (14) 4 (14) 16 (57) 5 (18) 1 (3) 3 (11) 2 (7) 17 (21)
USA (22) - 8 (36) 11 (50) 3 (14) 11 (50) 4 (20) 4 (20) 2 (10) 2 (9) 3 (14) 7 (32) 6 (27) 4 (18)
Countries with fewer than four institutional responses: Namibia, Argentina, Brazil, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, DRC, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Japan, Malta, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway,














multiple comorbidities. Fourteen (12 %) selected both
groups for screening.
Of 113 institutions quantifying the admissions
screened for VRE, 94 (83 %) would screen up to 10 %;
(25 (22 %) less than 1 %, 42 (37 %) 1–5 %, 5–10 %, 27
(24 %)). Only 19 (17 %) screened more inpatients, with 8
(7 %) screening 10–20 %, and 11 (10 %) screening over
20 % of inpatients.
Type of contact precautions
Of the 178 who completed the question, 116 (65 %)
always isolate identified colonized patients, 47 (26 %)
isolate if possible, and 10 (5 %) never isolate: Namibia
(1), Egypt (1), Sri Lanka(1), Argentina (1), DRC (1),
Nigeria (1), USA (4). Only five (3 %) institutions use mo-
lecular typing results to guide isolation strategies:
Australia (1), Canada (1), China (1), UK (3).
Environmental cleaning
Of 171 who responded, 93 (54 %) perform more regular
and more thorough manual cleaning. Fifty eight (34 %)
would clean the same as other rooms, of which 28
(16 %) would use increased cleaning efforts during an
outbreak. High technology non touch systems were
employed by 20 (12 %) in UK (4), USA (4), Denmark
(3), Belgium, (2), Malta, Nepal, Belarus, New Zealand,
Romania, Qatar and Australia (1 each).
‘Untagging’ of colonized patients
Of 173 responding institutions, 54 (31 %) would not
untag patients. Of the 96 (56 %) who do untag patients,
12 (7 %) would untag patients after a time period alone,
28 (16 %) would untag after a negative swab(s) alone,
and 56 (33 %) require both a time period and one or
more negative swabs to untag. Twenty three (13 %) do
not label patients after discharge.
Of the 82 institutions that described their swab re-
quirement for untagging patients, the majority of institu-
tions require 2, (28 %) or 3, (54 %) swabs to be negative,
whilst 10 % required one swab only. Seven respondents
(8 %) required 4 or more swabs before untagging a pa-
tient as a VRE carrier.
The time period to clear patients likewise demon-
strated great variation. Of the 68 institutions that nomi-
nated a time period as a criterion just 58 quantified it
with 47 (81 %) clearing patients within a year: 15 (26 %)
12 months, 17 (29 %) 6 months, and 15 (26 %) 3
months. Only 10 (17 %) required 24 months to clear a
patient, and 1 (1 %) over 24 months.
Intranational variation
Eleven countries (Australia, Canada, China, Denmark,
Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, Turkey,
UK, US) had responses from four or more institutions.
VRE was highly prioritized or prioritized the same as
other MDROs by the majority of countries, however in
the US there was almost equal spread between affording
VRE a high priority (36 %), the same as other MDROs
(27 %) and a low priority (36 %). The UK also varies in
its approach with 43 % giving VRE high priority, 27 %
the same as other MDROs and 23 % a low priority, with
7 % rarely considering it. Table 1 outlines the approaches
to screening, cleaning and untagging.
There was less heterogeneity in the approach to con-
tact precautions, with most countries always using con-
tact precautions in over 50 % of institutions (with the
exception of Turkey at 40 %), and the remainder of
institutions employing contact precautions where pos-
sible. The USA showed a varied approach between in-
stitutions with universal use in 82 % and never using
contact precautions in 18 %. In only Canada, Singapore
and Turkey did all institutions responding undertake
active surveillance. All other countries had respondents
divided on the issue of active surveillance or not. Full
data on contact precautions, VRE prioritization and
number of inpatients screened can be found in the
Additional file 2: Table S1.
Discussion
This international survey has highlighted the variation in
infection control approaches to VRE, within and be-
tween countries. Internationally, VRE still registers as an
agent of concern with 81 % prioritizing it equal to or
above other infection control efforts. Surveillance is
undertaken in 72 % of responding institutions, with the
majority rationalizing and finding merit in targeting high
risk groups mostly by risk of severe disease, but many by
risk of a positive result.
Although we received responses from 48 countries; we
were reluctant to equate small numbers of responses
from one country as truly representative; indeed the
widest variation in approach was seen in countries with
the greatest number of institutional responses such as
the UK and US.
Practices also don’t necessarily reflect local epidemi-
ology as VRE prevalence in the UK is 21 % [1], however
it is seen as high priority in only 43 % of responding
institutions and accordingly a third of institutions under-
taken no active screening. Countries with a lower preva-
lence of VRE such as Denmark (4.5 %) and the
Netherlands (1.1 %), prioritise VRE more highly (80 and
75 %), and more consistently isolate patients (71 and
100 %), alongside tagging at discharge [1].
The different approaches to infection prevention pro-
cesses across institutions in the UK and USA, may in
part be due to the fact that the infection control guide-
lines for these countries were last updated in 2006 [5, 6].
For instance active surveillance in the UK guideline is
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reserved for outbreaks while in the US there are several
choices including point prevalence surveillance periodic-
ally, testing of “at risk” patients and testing roommates
of VRE positive patients. Such advice now is not adhered
to nor is it relevant in the setting of endemic VRE.
Responses from countries with more recently updated
guidelines such as Singapore [8] showed greater yet still
imperfect consistency.
The variance in approaches within any country may
also be explained by differing views on the efficacy of
contact precautions to prevent transmission. A study of
discontinuation of contact precautions of haematology
patient’s admitted to single rooms in a unit in a before/
after study showed no significant difference in VRE
blood stream infection (BSI) between time periods [9].
Another Canadian study comparing rates of VRE BSI
between hospitals that employ screening and isolation
and those that abandoned screening, found a rise in
VRE BSI in all hospitals, but the rate of increase was
highest in non-screening hospitals – this study is not yet
complete however [10].
In terms of environmental cleaning, it was notable
that 11 % use high technology non touch cleaning sys-
tems. The benefit of this technology has been shown
to significantly reduce VRE acquisition in new occu-
pants of rooms previously occupied by VRE positive
patients [11].
Emerging as a “casual” survey, the response was be-
yond the authors’ expectations. We believe this was be-
cause the questions in hand were of genuine interest to
respondents in these 48 countries. Furthermore, the
study was designed to attract responses in being brief,
and permitting a response from anyone with self per-
ceived adequate local knowledge. No question was
compulsory so survey respondents could progress if
they could not or preferred no to answer, although still
each question saw >100 responses. These strengths
were also to some extent a weakness. Our study has
many inherent shortcomings. There was no selection of
institutions or participants and no submissions have
been validated. Additionally, as we did not provide defi-
nitions for terms used such as untagging, it is possible
that some questions were misinterpreted as it is hard to
believe that universal active surveillance (intended to
mean rectal swabbing and culture of patients on admis-
sion) is undertaken to this extent. The method of
recruitment of participants provides selection bias to-
wards more active infection control teams, and therefore
more aggressive approaches may be overrepresented in
the survey.
Despite the shortcomings of our methods, we found
considerable variation in reported practices. Untagging
of patients is either never done, or automatic on dis-
charge or in between where the time course can be
months to years and negative swabs required can be
from 0 to 6. Given the lack of data in this area to inform
practice, this variation is unsurprising. Practitioners in
hospitals therefore are forced to create institutional pol-
icy. These policies and therefore practices will be based
on personal viewpoints, local epidemiology (national as
well as affecting that healthcare facility), the available
infrastructure and capacity to isolate as well as competi-
tion for infection control resources from newer emer-
ging multi drug resistant organisms (MDROs).
Our survey highlights reported variation in infection
control practices related to VRE. Further research on
optimal infection prevention practices and development
of guidance in this area is warranted. The survey repre-
sents a request from infection control practitioners in
48 countries for the development of a guideline that
can be adapted to a nation’s or a hospital’s require-
ments. Until that time practices will remain chaotic
with the ensuing suboptimal use of infection control re-
sources internationally.
Additional files
Additional file 1: The full survey questionairre. (PDF 95 kb)
Additional file 2: Table S1. Countries with four or more institutions
represented: (Number, with percentage relating to the total responses
from that country per specific question). (DOCX 14 kb)
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